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Abstract 
When Elizabeth Gaskell’s reputation was revived in the 1980s and 1990s, Ruth was reread 
along with the factory novels, and uneasily assimilated to the secular socio-economistic, 
feminist Gaskell that emerged at that time. Ruth’s overt religiosity was necessarily 
downplayed, however, and it was reconstructed as a social novel about the sexual double 
standard. What happened to religion? This article argues that it is effaced by historicism: 
Gaskell’s and ours. Ruth was Gaskell’s attempt to reimagine social fiction; but it was only a 
first stage, a transitional work that looks towards a different kind of ethical fiction-reading 
subject who will be a different kind of agent in social change. Rather than proposing a 
naively transcendental solution to the conditions of history and ideology, whether in the 
Romantic form of feeling or the Christian form of faith in God, Gaskell offers an explanatory 
fable of social renewal through the energy of the outsider. Ruth is like her Moabite 
namesake: she foregoes her own religious identity as a devout Protestant Christian to take up 
a greater genealogical imperative, to instate the lineage of a new secular religion. In this 
respect, the fate of Ruth itself has been somewhat akin to the fate of the biblical heroine. For 
it too stands as a kind of lone Moabite among the Israelites, an outsider fiction seeking 
religion’s readmission to the vital debates about feminism, social realism, and the role of 
fiction in social change, and promising that it can go whither they go.  
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A Moabite among the Israelities: Ruth, religion, and the Victorian social novel 
_____ 
Ruth (1853) is the least popular and least interesting of all Elizabeth Gaskell’s novels to 
modern readers. Something of an anomaly in Gaskell’s oeuvre, it is jammed awkwardly 
between the two kinds of fiction for which she is best known: Manchester factory novels; and 
comic-melancholic idylls of small-town and village life in the hinterlands of the 
manufacturing and commercial centres. Like Mary Barton (1848) and North and South 
(1854), which frame it, Ruth is a novel with a purpose, directing its readers’ attention and 
sympathies to the ‘great social evil.’1 But its story ‘lies far from all class-feelings, from all 
the subjects for blue-books and commissions of inquiry,’ as one of its first reviewers 
remarked.2 It has none of its predecessor’s sprawling and unruly vitality, but a distinctive 
compactness of scene and character. Its ‘subject is less grand, less inspiring; there is no 
attempt to produce a modern epic in the guise of a novel, to embody the sufferings and the 
lives of a class which is counted by millions.’3 Nor does romantic love play any part in the 
resolution of Ruth. Gaskell was determined not to use romance, as she had done in Mary 
Barton and would do in North and South, as a ‘regulating law between both parties’4 to 
provide ‘imaginary or “formal” solutions’ to what were in reality ‘unresolvable social 
contradictions’5 in the public sphere. Most of all, though, Ruth is disliked now for its 
uncomfortably intense and somewhat dated religiosity. All Gaskell’s fiction was ‘a vehicle 
for her belief’: writing was for her ‘a religious exercise and therefore “permissible”’ to the 
wife of a Unitarian minister. But Ruth is different.6 Even Gaskell’s contemporaries were 
taken aback to find that she had retreated from the big questions of the industrial novel to this 
‘moral problem worked out in fiction,’ and some were concerned that there was, ‘perhaps, 
over much religion in [Ruth’s] pages ... to be perfectly satisfactory.’7  
 Was this where Gaskell’s fiction was going? Charlotte Brontë, wondering, raised an 
eyebrow over the early chapters of the following novel, North and South, which began with 
Mr Hale and ‘his religious difficulties as a conscientious man of the Church.’8 As we now 
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know, that novel resumed the battle between masters and men, and Ruth receded into the 
background between two of the big Victorian documents of class struggle, leaving its 
eponymous heroine to her quietude and fervour, teary piety, and glad, brave self-sacrifice. 
When Gaskell’s reputation was revived in the 1980s and 90s, Ruth was duly re-read along 
with the factory novels,9 but was only ever uneasily assimilated to the secular socio-
economistic, feminist Gaskell that emerged out of and responded to Thatcherist hard times.10 
Its overt religiosity was downplayed, and it was reconstructed as a social novel about the 
fallen woman and the sexual double standard, which modern readers tried to fit into the 
existing genealogy of mid-Victorian condition-of-England fiction. Was this a result of our 
modern-day embarrassment at Ruth’s lavish pietistic sentimentality? Our distaste for the 
heavy odour of evangelical repression and duty? Part of the problem, I would suggest, is that 
Ruth actively resists any simple classification as either a religious novel or a social novel. 
After Mary Barton Gaskell turned her back on the then-accepted conventions of industrial 
fiction—in Martineau, Dickens, Mrs Trollope, and Disraeli—in order to bring the plots and 
tropes of religious belief and conduct into the service of a new kind of social novel. Like 
Kingsley’s Alton Locke (1850), to which it is in many points a response,11 Ruth presents a 
case for Christian radicalism: not a system of cooperative socialism like Kingsley’s, but a 
form of community-minded individualist quietism so deeply interpenetrated with emerging 
liberal values (sympathy, tolerance) that it could be absorbed into the secular society to which 
it appealed. Ruth’s radicalism, therefore, lies (as it did for George Eliot later in Felix Holt, the 
Radical) in a paradoxical return to the roots of social action in the past—in this case, in the 
Christian traditions of good works. To interpret Ruth aright is to enlarge our view of history, 
reminding ourselves that ‘in order to understand Victorian fiction it is essential to understand 
Victorian religion.’12 This essay accordingly redirects the historicist interpretation of 
Victorian social-problem fiction through the screen of biblical criticism. It argues that 
Gaskell found a way of overcoming the challenge set by Mary Barton of a social-problem 
fiction that put itself in competition with statistics and blue books and market forces.  Rather 
than proposing a naively transcendental solution to the conditions of history and ideology, 
whether in the Romantic form of feeling or the Christian form of faith in God, Gaskell offers 
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an explanatory fable of social renewal through the energy of the outsider. Ruth is like her 
Moabite namesake: she foregoes her own religious identity (as a devout Protestant Christian 
in her case) to take up a greater genealogical imperative, to instate the lineage of a new 
secular religion. In this respect, the fate of Ruth itself has been somewhat akin to the fate of 
the biblical heroine. For it too stands as a kind of lone Moabite among the Israelites, an 
outsider fiction seeking religion’s readmission to the vital debates about feminism, social 
realism, and the role of fiction in social change, and promising that it can go whither they go. 
Ruth is not just the stranger who challenges the prevailing rules of the closed community, 
therefore, like Margaret Hale after her. She is the stranger who challenges the prevailing 
values of the national community and the prevailing discourses of social progress, and who, 
having done her epic work, is allowed to pass out of history. Thus does Ruth pass out of 
literary history too. Gaskell’s short-lived excursion into the strange territory of the novel of 
piety—a territory then being taken up by Charlotte Yonge and others—vanishes with its 




Taking their cue from Mary Barton’s conflicted and (self-confessedly) inept politics, modern 
critics have tended to interpret Ruth’s story of fallenness as part of a more or less continuous 
project in Gaskell’s social-problem fiction ‘to criticize utilitarian calculation and 
determinism.’13 In this vein Amanda Anderson, for example, argues that Bradshaw inhabits 
‘fully the corrupt instrumental egotism of the public realm,’ and with his ‘insidious “practical 
wisdom,” serves to accentuate the negative effects of mutually reinforcing social and 
religious determinisms.’14 On the other hand, Ruth Hilton ‘is vindicated and redeemed 
through her instinctive participation in a noninstrumental, sympathetic mode of being’: her 
‘noncalculating morality of sympathy.’15 Ruth’s ‘pure unknowingness,’ the 
unselfconsciousness that led to her seduction and rejection in the first place, is here 
contrasted with the deliberative morality of the utilitarian mainstream: where moral action is 
based on the judgment of consequences, which breeds a culture of retributive justice.16 This 
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is a perceptive analysis of Ruth’s cardinal binary opposition between instrumental and non-
instrumental morality, which nevertheless falls into the trap of implying that Protestantism 
belongs exclusively in the male public realm, where it is characterized as the religious arm of 
utilitarianism, and where ‘mutually reinforcing social and religious determinisms’ do their 
mischief.17 In this argument the non-calculating morality of sympathy is by contrast also 
somehow non-Protestant: that is, it is progressive—radical—because it is Romantic, 
humanistic, liberal, and secular.  
 Why should we not want to see Ruth Hilton for what she is, a devout Protestant 
Christian? The answer lies with Gaskell, and the place of Unitarian Protestantism in her 
enterprise of recivilizing and remoralizing the culture of industrial capitalism in the post-
Chartist 1850s. In Mary Barton her aim, she wrote, was to ‘give a spur to inactive thought, 
and languid conscience.’18 This was the familiar view of social fiction as ethical praxis, 
targeting specific problems and demanding direct, focused action. Gaskell quickly 
recognized, however, that the inequality of masters and men could not be remedied by 
striving for mutual understanding between the classes, but only by altering the structure of 
society. That was the lesson of the failure of Chartism, and it was fundamentally inimical to 
‘middle-class Unitarians [who always] negotiated their demands for equality—religious, 
social, and political—within the inherited hierarchical norms of English society.’19 Where 
was left for Gaskell’s Carlylean ‘fiction with a purpose’ to go? The answer lay in another 
direction: viewing social fiction as a model for a gradualist social morality. Mary Barton’s 
originality lay in its representation of the classes meeting and befriending each other as 
individuals, hearing each other’s stories of hardship and pride, and seeing how the other lived 
and died. This was the rich territory of the novel. But the challenge to translate social 
representation into social morality was as great as the challenge to translate it into social 
action. Gaskell’s high-minded ambition to promote a solution to class warfare with Mary 
Barton had left her open to charges of naivety: social suffering on that scale could hardly be 
fixed by legislative reform as, say, the conditions for chimney-sweepers could. But its 
alternative, an ethically mimetic social fiction, opened her to the charge of colluding in a 
systemic hypocrisy. Fiction, she feared, would only draw (in Mary Poovey’s words) ‘an 
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increasingly definite boundary between the imaginary world depicted in the novel, where 
ethical values could prevail, and the actual world outside, where corruption and greed seemed 
to make moral certainty impossible.’20  And as Carolyn Betensky adds, mid-Victorian 
purposive fiction produced a highly-developed bourgeois social conscience in which ‘reading 
and knowing and feeling are in themselves socially valuable,’ so that ‘the pursuit of 
knowledge of the poor may actually preclude the very consequence of intervention that it is 
supposed to activate.’21 The social novel was always at risk of encouraging moral 
complacency in its readers, a satisfied sense that their emotional engagement with the 
problems of the world was valuable enough in itself. Ruth’s big question, ‘“Is it not time to 
change some of our ways of acting and thinking?”,’22 brings reading and knowing and feeling 
into the orbit of practical action. This call to charitable enterprise brought Gaskell ‘within the 
circle of what must be called religious novelists’23 for the first and last time. When George 
Henry Lewes reviewed the novel for the radical Leader, he noted that Gaskell had swapped 
‘the struggle between employers and employed for the old and ever-renewing struggle 
between Truth and Truth-seeming, virtue and convention, good deeds and bad names.’24 In 
other words Ruth did not pre-eminently concern itself with a struggle between powerful men 
and powerless women: Gaskell was ‘not pleading only for her own sex,’25 as the Guardian 
saw, but for both sexes. What these contemporary observations bear out is that in Ruth 
Gaskell was not trying to write a social-problem novel that fulfilled its role of provoking 
debate about, and active intervention in, the social problem of the sexual double standard and 
the fallen woman. It had another, higher aim, one that would become the hallmark of the 
ethico-aesthetic social fiction written, for example, by George Eliot, and endorsed by 
Matthew Arnold: fiction dedicated to the formation and maintenance of civic subjects in 
industrial modernity. The question Ruth asks, therefore, is: how can Christianity continue to 
be relevant to secular ethics, and especially to the promulgation of ethics in literature, which 
was, after all, usurping the ethical functions of Christianity? If the fallen woman was ‘an unfit 
subject for fiction,’ as she feared, so too, in its way, was Christianity.  
 This points to the great challenge Gaskell faced with Ruth. Readers not alienated by 
the worldliness of the plot were likely to be alienated by the Godliness of the novel’s themes 
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and treatment, and vice versa. Ruth’s predominant readership was one of undoctrinal, middle-
of-the-road, established-church Protestants, for whom fiction should reveal ‘the real meaning 
of Christianity, in social and ethical, rather than in doctrinal terms,’26 and who would be wary 
of the merest hint of Nonconformist extremism in Ruth’s devout example. In this regard 
Unitarianism was Gaskell’s best protection. It was necessary to obscure her protagonists’ 
exact sectarian affiliations, because Unitarianism was feared and reviled, as Ruth Watts 
points out, for leading its adherents to  
disbelief in religion altogether. There was some justification for this. The 
abandonment of some of the central tenets of traditional Christianity, constant 
questioning of the scriptures, enthusiasm for scientific discovery and a passion for 
social justice all contributed to readjustments of faith that took some out of 
Unitarianism into scepticism, agnosticism or even atheism.27 
On the other hand, Gaskell could also take advantage of sectarian differences and 
antagonisms among Dissenters that were not always recognized by outsiders (who tended to 
viewed Nonconformity homogeneously) to displace the worst excesses of Calvinism and 
paternalism onto Bradshaw’s bigoted evangelicalism. The Bensons, on the other hand, allow 
Gaskell to disavow sectarian or even explicitly religious discourse, and to share her 
mainstream readers’ distaste for proselytizing, conversion, and tracts. The Unitarians were 
committed to realizing religious ideals through non-religious discourses. In this context Ruth 
Hilton is a prime example of what the Unitarian Lucy Aikin called in 1839 ‘rational religion 
… silently working its way in society.’28 Because Unitarianism was dedicated to the 
reproduction of the ‘the rational perpetually self-improving, enquiring, public-spirited 
individual,’29 Gaskell managed to present a highly-charged, unashamedly holy Protestantism 
as a model for ethical behaviour in an increasingly secular society.  
 Moreover Unitarianism was a direct object of Gaskell’s criticism in Ruth as it had 
been in Mary Barton. Cross Street Chapel, as Valentine Cunningham points out, was where 
the bourgeoisie of Manchester, including ‘the millocracy, the benefactors, the leaders, of 
Manchester society’, worshipped God.30 The Unitarians were notably pluralistic and tolerant, 
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rational and socially radical; a force for social justice, equality, and reform, and champions of 
feminism. Manchester Unitarians, however, for all their social radicalism, held, as Jenny 
Uglow observes, to ‘an ideal of individualism rather than one of equality, to the ethic of the 
market as much as that of the Gospels.’31 Advocating the primacy of economic freedom, they 
‘did not take kindly to interfering criticisms of the free-market forces of political economy. 
Even apologists for Unitarian progressivism cannot mask the sect’s illiberality in this 
respect.’32 Some of the fiercest criticism of Mary Barton had come from this ‘bourgeois 
Dissenting quarter’ close to home, led by Gaskell’s fellow worshipper at Cross Street, 
William Rathbone Greg. Mary Barton was ‘more than a woman’s protest against a man’s 
world,’ therefore; ‘with exceptional courage Mrs. Gaskell is prepared to suggest that all is not 
well with the code of the Liberal-bourgeois-Dissenting millocracy. And the accused were not 
a distant and alien body of people: Mary Barton hurt friends.’33  
 Far from being heterodox, however, or worse—a woman speaking out of turn—
Gaskell’s forthrightness was entirely in keeping with the pluralistic critical traditions of 
Unitarianism, in which freedom of religious opinion, doctrinal individualism, and the right of 
women to participate in public discourse were all cardinal tenets. Thus, in Ruth Gaskell stood 
against the political elite in the Manchester congregations once again, arguing passionately 
that Unitarian social justice must involve more than intellectual debate, social policy reform 
and parliamentary representation. It must also cultivate the ‘higher charity,’ the attainment of 
social equity and social reform through a non-denominational, unevangelical, and non-
paternalistic practice of good works, which united people of all classes in a single purpose.34 
Gaskell’s own tireless work with the Unitarian Domestic Mission co-founded by her husband 
in 1833, and with other voluntary associations, was vital here. The Mission’s ‘strategy of 
visiting the poor became a mainstay of philanthropic practice and inspired many similar 
charities,’35 and was ‘part of a much wider middle-class drive to intervene in working-class 
life in these years.’36 It was also instrumental in developing the liberal idea of civil society as 
an important site of social existence outside the state, where ‘an ethical vision of social life’ 
would prosper because people of all ranks were sharing a public space. John James Tayler, 
minister at the nearby Upper Brook Street Chapel and a leading figure in the Manchester 
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Domestic Mission, complained in 1842 of ‘the difficulty in uniting persons of all classes’ in 
communities of worship, contending that ‘without effacing those social distinctions which for 
wise and good purposes are permitted to exist, there are occasions when it is good for all … 
to meet on the common ground of men and brethren.’37  
 As Howard Wach argues, Tayler was influenced by the New England Unitarians, who 
were moderating the native Priestleyan rationalism of the sect with a strain of Romantic 
social organicism: ‘The higher charity, like the religion it drew upon, began in feeling. It was 
not an abstract principle.’38 And the life of (religious) feeling began in the family. It was not 
expected ‘in the market, the exchange, the warehouse or the workshop,’ wrote John Gooch 
Robberds, William Gaskell’s colleague: ‘These are not the places in which men in general 
think of taking their religion with them.’39 For Elizabeth Gaskell, however, that was precisely 
the problem. Ruth is about the supreme importance of religious feeling in social 
transformation, and the role of the novel in representing and inspiring religious feeling—by 
which Gaskell means fellow-feeling. The novel is aligned in this way with charitable 
institutions as part of civil society: its community of readers comprised individual moral 
agents with a shared concern; it was committed to testing ‘the boundaries and languages of 
social relations outside the realm of formal politics and establish[ing] the sources of moral 
authority which define hegemonic social relationship’;40 and it was crucial in introducing 
competing discourses into the public realm, especially ‘conceptions of social and political 
organization, hierarchies of knowledge, and prescriptive foundations of public and private 
morality.’41  
 For the Unitarians, domesticity and the family provided an obvious model for a 
paternalistic culture of charity. As John Seed contends, the ‘language of paternalism, derived 
from the private spheres of family and church offered an ideological model of class relations 
and a way of articulating precise problems of social policy’ to the liberals,42 especially those 
for whom there was only one God, God the father. On the face of it, Gaskell might be 
expected to conform to this ideal. Motherhood was to her ‘the role par excellence whereby 
women achieve knowledge, autonomy and power,’ and the first duty of women was to be in 
the home.43 But she also ‘believed women should have moral responsibility for themselves, 
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should speak out when necessary as she did, share in the creation of values and do their own 
appointed work,’ and she strongly supported women who chose to go into public life. 
Moreover in Ruth Gaskell carefully sets up a contrast between two family structures. One of 
them is stiflingly conventional, respectable, and patriarchal, dedicated to the transmission of 
property and values exclusively through blood and marriage. The other is a highly 
unconventional, flexible and inclusive social formation, which has no patriarch or hierarchy, 
is not based on any assumption of blood relationship, sexual difference or prescriptive gender 
roles, and whose paragon of domestic womanliness is a mother, but also a fallen woman and 
a working woman.  
 In the Bradshaw family, the patriarchal head transmutes Calvinistic consciousness of 
sin, awakening of grace, and commitment to a life in Christ into Pharisaical moral rigidity, 
cant, self-complacency, severe censure of others’ weaknesses, and the empty display of ritual 
worship. It is obvious from the start that if the Bensons are on the side of Truth, virtue, and 
good deeds, then Bradshaw, the oppressive paterfamilias, is a humbug on the side of Truth-
seeming, convention, and bad names. But it is not as simple as that. Gaskell is asking her 
readers to consider exactly what it is that constitutes a serious Christian life: to ask what it 
means to preach and practice forgiveness. Bradshaw is undoubtedly the utilitarian king in his 
counting house, whose ‘love of the purely useful’ (154) controls his ethical conduct (and is 
reflected even in his name, which is the same as the publisher of the famous Victorian 
railway timetables). Justice, for Bradshaw, is ‘certain and inflexible’ (195), calculated 
according to unalterable moral principles and applicable to every circumstance, without 
consideration of anything that might bear upon, or mitigate, the matter (hence his angry 
incapacity to understand Benson’s refusal to prosecute his son Richard when the boy’s guilt 
is revealed). In love with ‘the pomp of principle’ (176), as his business partner Farquhar so 
nicely puts it, Bradshaw is stained ‘by no vice himself, either in his own eyes or in that of any 
human being who cared to judge him,’ which allows him to ‘speak and act with a severity 
which was almost sanctimonious in its ostentation of thankfulness as to himself’ (172). Aptly, 
he is ‘a tall, large-boned, iron man; stern, powerful, and authoritative in appearance; dressed 
in clothes of the finest broadcloth, and scrupulously ill-made, as if to show that he was 
 11 
indifferent to all outward things’ (126). Like most utilitarians in the mid-Victorian novel, 
Bradshaw is close to a caricature of the ultra-masculine philistine, an aggrandizer of all 
material progress and mercantile values who is scornful of the namby-pambyism of liberals 
and, naturally, utterly opposed to the idea that feeling enters into ethical or any other 
decisions: ‘‘It’s your sentimentalists that nurse up sin’’ (328), he snaps at Benson, whom he 
constantly bullies (and patronises) for the naivety of his unrealistic and impracticable moral 
idealism. Bradshaw does not suffer fools, and to him almost everyone is a fool: 
He drew a clear line of partition, which separated mankind into two great 
groups, to one of which, by the grace of God, he and his belonged; while the 
other was composed of those whom it was his duty to try and reform, and 
bring the whole force of his morality to bear upon, with lectures, admonitions, 
and exhortations—a duty to be performed, because it was a duty—but with 
very little of that Hope and Faith which is the Spirit that maketh alive (262) 
 Thurstan Benson embodies the moral code that the novel opposes to Bradshaw’s. 
With ‘his pure, child-like nature’ (92), he is the feminine man whose physical deformity 
leads him into a life of plain living and high thinking that is completely at odds with 
Bradshaw’s coarse energy and natural tendency towards action: ‘it was that early injury to his 
spine which affected the constitution of his mind as well as his body, and predisposed him, in 
the opinion of some at least, to a feminine morbidness of conscience’ (305). Susceptible to 
unwholesome brooding, and ‘more given to thought than to action’ (305), Benson is prone to 
the moral uncertainty of one for whom feeling is as important and as precious as reason, and 
for whom utilitarianism is anathema: ‘My indecision about right and wrong—my perplexity 
as to how far we are to calculate consequences—grows upon me, I fear’ (164), he confesses 
to his sister, ‘a more masculine character than her brother’ who ‘kept him in check by her 
clear, pithy talk, which brought back his wandering thoughts to the duty that lay straight 
before him, waiting for action’ (167). In one sense, Benson’s moral confusion is the price he 
pays for his gift to Ruth, the lie he tells to protect her: 
‘I have got what you call morbid just in consequence of the sophistry by 
which I persuaded myself that wrong could be right. I torment myself. I have 
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lost my clear instincts of conscience. Formerly, if I believed that such or such 
an action was according to the will of God, I went and did it, or at least I tried 
to do it, without thinking of consequences. Now, I reason and weigh what will 
happen if I do so and so—I grope where formerly I saw’ (293) 
 Against the Bradshaw notion of duty—a mechanical deference to spiritual authority, 
and an unthinking obligation to evangelize—the Bensons represent what the novel describes 
as a Wordsworthian ideal of duty: ‘their lives were pure and good, not merely from a lovely 
and beautiful nature, but from some law, the obedience to which was, of itself, harmonious 
peace, and which governed them almost implicitly, and with as little questioning on their 
part, as the glorious stars which haste not, rest not, in their eternal obedience’ (115). The 
direct reference here to Wordsworth’s ‘Ode to Duty’ (1804)—duty is the law that ‘dost 
preserve the stars from wrong’ (l.47)—implicitly contrasts a genuinely Christian conception 
of duty, which only comes with the internalization of the moral law, and the pharisaical duty 
of the law-knowers, who do good by conscious intent and not by habit.44 One must be a ‘law 
unto oneself’: in other words, if you do not have the law, you must ‘do by nature the things 
contained in the law’ (Romans 2:13-15). In this idea of duty Gaskell proposes that the 
instinctual moral subjectivity of Romanticism unites with and tempers the hyper-
conscientious moral subjectivity of Protestantism. In place of ‘the self-scrutinizing anxieties 
of traditional Nonconformity’,45 Ruth extols the pure conscience of the Wordsworthian child, 
with its unselfconscious adherence to right: those ‘who ask not if thine eye / Be on them’ 
(ll.9-10) but ‘do thy work, and know it not’ (l.14). 
 The contrast between these two models of duty repeats the New Testament opposition 
between the law of the Pharisees, with its doctrinaire condemnation of sinners, and the love 
of Jesus, which actively seeks them out. The Bensons’ ‘pious fraud’ is explicitly aligned with 
Christ’s defence of Mary Magdalen against the sophism of the Pharisees. Ruth is represented 
successively and sometimes even simultaneously as a Magdalen-figure, a figure for Mary, the 
mother of Christ (the ‘gentle, blessed mother’ in her dark-blue sack-cloth (1.289; 2.29)), and 
a Christ-figure of a distinctively Unitarian kind. Unitarians rejected the Trinity and, thus, the 
divinity of Christ, who was seen rather as a ‘divinely chosen, physically vulnerable and 
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morally fallible’ man,46 and accordingly refuted the doctrines of original sin and atonement. 
At once exceptional in her purity of soul and heroic courage—a human being chosen by God 
for a special purpose, as the Unitarian Christ is—she represents the innate human capacity for 
weakness and sin as well as strength and righteousness. She is less a victim of the ‘great 
social evil’ than an emblem of the universality of social evil, and the bitter necessity of a long 
labour of penitence, duty and loving-kindness that will lead, ultimately, to social salvation. 
From one point of view, then, Ruth is a kind of scapegoat—a figure for substitutionary 
atonement, like Christ, except that she was created by someone who believed in neither 
atonement nor original sin. But from another point of view she is a modern Magdalen: not as 
that word had been appropriated by Victorians so as to avoid having to call prostitutes and 
unmarried mothers what they were, but an intercessor, like the Virgin Mary, whose tears of 
compassion mediate between God and humanity in Phineas Fletcher’s epigraph to the 
novel.  
 More inventively still, Gaskell relates Mary Magdalen typologically to the 
compassionate and loyal Old Testament heroine who gives her name to the novel. In doing so 
she is not just adding another layer of biblical symbolism to a plot of redemption through 
duty: she is offering Ruth Hilton as a figure of epic grandeur. The biblical Ruth is the arch-
outsider, one of the idolatrous Moabites so reviled by the Israelites (as the Unitarians were 
reviled by their fellow Christians as ‘disguised papists and infidels, … Jacobins and French 
spies, … Jews’47). She arrives in Israel as a result of complex circumstances. Elimelech and 
Naomi choose to escape famine by fleeing to Moab, ‘the home of the historical enemies of 
the Israelites,’ which suggests, as Bonnie Honig points out, that ‘the Israelites have fallen 
away from their fundamental moral principles.’48 When Elimelech and his sons die in Moab, 
leaving their mother to return alone, her daughter-in-law Ruth insists on accompanying her 
home to Israel, famously responding to Naomi’s protest: ‘whither thou goest, I will go … 
Thy people shall be my people … Thy god … my god.’49 Ruth and Naomi ‘establish a joint 
household,’ and Ruth’s ‘precarious position in the Israelite order is stabilized by a marriage 
[to Boaz] and birth [of a son] that provide the founding energy for a new monarchic regime.’ 
Ruth, Honig argues,  
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is the vehicle through which the Law comes alive again, generations after the death of 
the lawgiver, Moses. Ruth’s immigration and conversion reperform the social contract 
of Sinai and allow the Israelites to re-experience their own initial conversion, faith, or 
wonder before the law.50 
Ruth is thus a byword for the seductive power of the woman to attract men to idolatry, the 
woman who ‘unsettles the order she joins,’ and out of whose otherness a new order is born: 
the lineage that ends in King David.51 Through the course of Gaskell’s novel, Ruth Hilton 
slowly emerges from the unworldly space of the chapel-house and goes out into the world, as 
if in fulfillment of a mission, to unsettle its order and to instate, in her son, a new order. With 
the quiet fervour of a committed revivalist, she re-energizes a Protestant culture that has 
become moribund by re-universalising the Protestant ideology that is embodied in marginal 
Nonconformists like Thurstan Benson. In this way, authentic Christian attitudes and values 
can once more permeate the secular world.  
 Why, then, should Ruth die? Does she re-enchant a world that is unable to 
accommodate her exceptionalism? Having achieved what she has been sent (by the novelist) 
to do, does she perish because there are no Ruths in realist Eccleston, after all—no saints, 
prophets, heroes, no one with such unworldly charisma, such purity of soul, such 
incorruptible rectitude? Is Ruth a modern-day St. Teresa, an impossible ideal for the striving 
provincial Englishwoman: like Dorothea Brooke in George Eliot’s Middlemarch a foundress 
of nothing? Or is she, like her biblical namesake, silenced by her own founding act, excluded 
from the patrilineage she initiates?52 I think the answer lies in the celebrated vow: ‘Thy 
people shall be my people.’ Gaskell’s Ruth is a call to restore religious feeling—the 
unconditional love of the alien sinner, the Moabite/Magdalen—to the heart of secular liberal 
pluralism, the Israel of the Lawgivers and keepers: the Pharisaical political economists and 
utilitarians, the masters and men. Ruth’s fate, seen in this light, looks strangely like a 
symbolic playing-out of the fate of the ‘vanishing mediator.’ Here I am applying, or rather 
adapting, a term of Fredric Jameson’s explicated in great detail in a well-known essay of his 
on a structure in Weber’s social thought. To put the argument simply, Protestantism itself is a 
vanishing mediator. The historical transition from medieval feudalism to capitalist modernity 
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could only be achieved, he suggests, through the privatization of religious experience, which 
shifted the culture of asceticism and self-examination from the monastic enclosures of 
Catholicism to the internal lives of ordinary people. Once Protestantism ‘has accomplished 
the task of allowing a rationalization of innerworldly life to take place, it has no further 
reason for being and disappears from the historical scene.’53 Thus, ‘religionalization becomes 
itself the principal agent in the process of secularization,’ because the sanctification of life, 
Weber tells us, ‘could thus almost take on the character of a business enterprise. A 
thoroughgoing Christianization of the whole of life was the consequence of this methodical 
quality of ethical conduct into which Calvinism as distinct from Lutheranism forced men.’ 
The religionization of everyday life leads to ‘the disappearance of religion itself as an 
ultimate value from the henceforth totally rationalized and desacralized world of the capitalist 
market-place.’54  
 The ‘humanization of the world goes hand in hand with a spreading philosophic and 
existential despair,’ however, which is expressed partly in a struggle between two bourgeois 
traditions, which, Jameson shows, are manifested as ‘two parental systems’ representing 
respectively ‘contemplation and action ... meaning and activity’: ethics and religion versus 
politics and business.55 They are in essence maternal (Ruth’s family) and paternal 
(Bradshaw’s family), and oppose the mother’s value system (an inward sense of values) with 
the father’s value system (‘routine action in a mechanical and unexamined scheme of 
things).’56 From this perspective, Ruth Hilton’s life and death can be thought of as a 
dramatized reenactment of the process Jameson describes. She is the vanishing mediator in 
this narrative, who heralds a distinctively Unitarian renewal of the religionization of everyday 
life, and inaugurates, in the person of her son, a new lineage, a new order, a new social 
morality.  
 Ruth’s re-sanctification of the charitable life is not, however, at odds with the world 
of business. To call Ruth a hypocritical novel, then, is only to suggest that, like the Reverend 
Benson, it serves God humbly and faithfully, while continuing to place its faith in the system 
that issues dividends on canal shares, as long as its operatives (the Richard Bradshaws) have 
internalized their moral duty. The Bensons’ pious fraud, moreover, is above all a useful lie. In 
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this regard, Benson (whose name echoes Bentham) has a very utilitarian idea of virtue: his is 
the socially beneficial lie, the fiction tolerated for the sake of its probable consequences, 
conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The lie is not the engine of a 
tragic mischief, nor does it delay the fateful workings of providence. Ruth dies accidentally, 
and only as a result of her sedulous virtue. Ruth does not disavow the economic world and its 
utilitarian ways, in other words, but seeks only to resacralize them by the diffusion of a new 
humanitarianism and the renewal of the Protestant work ethic. Ruth Hilton does not represent 
a life-affirming liberal humanism in opposition to a deathly puritanism, nor a secular 
Romantic ideal of feeling in opposition to Utilitarian calculation, nor fictional discourse in 
opposition to the discourse of political economy. She is, rather, the Moabite among the 
Israelites, as Ruth, too, is the idolatrous outsider: a religious novel among the strenuously 
social mid-Victorian social novels. This is not a social-problem novel, therefore, in which the 
social problem is the fallen woman, as the social problem in Mary Barton and North and 
South is the inequality of masters and men. Ruth triumphs in its own disappearance: the 
disappearance of the Christian life into the Christianization of the whole of life, and the 
disappearance of the novel of Christian piety into a Christianized social fiction. 
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